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1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of the Internet has radically changed the tourism industry, 
the organization of tourism markets and the pricing mechanisms deve-
loped by tourism firms. Tourism is the best developed and most innovative 
online business,1 supported by the emergence of various types of online 
travel agencies (OTAs) and sophisticated pricing and segmentation strate-
gies. There are some leading global OTAs2 that dominate the distribution 
* The authors acknowledge valuable comments from Laurence Saglietto and Régis 
Chenavaz. The authors thank Giacomo Del Chiappa, Milena Gradeva, Ulrike Gretzel, 
Miriam Scaglione, Dejan Trifunovic, and participants in the ENTER 2012 Conference 
in Helsingborg, Sweden and the 27 JMA in Angers, France, for comments and sugges-
tions on preliminary versions of the paper.
† E-mail: malgorzata.ogonowska@gredeg.cnrs.fr, dominique.torre@gredeg.cnrs.fr
1 Longhi [2004, 2009]; http://www.journaldunet.com/cc/10_tourisme/tourisme_
marche_fr.shtml; http://www.journaldunet.com/ebusiness/commerce/e-commerce-
en-france/sites-les-plus-rentables.shtml; http://webaly.co.in/ecommerce.html.
2 CheapOAir, Expedia, Opodo, Orbitz, Priceline.
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of travel and tourism services; however, the spread of the Internet has 
allowed the emergence of niche players. Most of these smaller players spe-
cialise in specific market segments focused on particular destinations or 
services; some have experimented with innovative pricing models inclu-
ding opaque selling. Hotwire3 and Priceline4 are the two companies that 
have been the most successful in exploiting this latter strategy on the 
US market. They offer opaque products, that is, airline tickets and hotel 
rooms where the airline and travel schedule, the hotel name and exact 
location are only revealed when the payment is completed. Priceline has 
developed an online pricing mechanism which it calls Name-Your-Own-
Price (NYOP), where, instead of posting a price, the seller receives offers 
from potential buyers which it can then accept or reject. Opaque models 
offer significant discounts to price conscious consumers with relatively 
low valuations of the product as the counterpart to opacity and uncer-
tainty, and simultaneously allow suppliers to ‘sell their excess inventory 
through a “brand-shielded model”, thus enabling suppliers to maintain 
overall pricing integrity for their inventory’5 and helping them to manage 
dynamically demand fluctuations for a fixed short-term supply.
According to TravelClick,6 opaque selling OTAs accounted for 6% of the 
hotel reservations of major hotel brands in 2011. In addition, some 10,000 
of 70,000 unsold airline tickets are sold daily through Priceline.com to lei-
sure travellers, who account for over 90% of its customers. Priceline and 
Hotwire are ranked among the top 10 of most popular travel websites in the 
US, recording respectively 10.23% and 6.23% of overall US-based OTA’s vis-
its in March, 2012.7 These evidences raise several questions. What are the 
advantages of such pricing systems for suppliers, intermediaries and con-
sumers? Why would hotels and airline companies be willing to sell their 
products through Priceline/Hotwire and lose the advantage (and profit) 
3 Acquired by Expedia in 2003.
4 Which has since acquired Booking.com in 2005, Agoda in 2007 and most recently 
Kayak in 2012, and since became one of leading market players. For more extensive 
information see Priceline.com Incorporated Company Pro le by Marketline, 2013.
5 http://www.traveldividends.com/programs/online-travel-agency-programs/
6 TravelClick Distribution Channel Performance Outlook Report, 1st Quater 2012, 
www.travelclick.com/infomation-center/bookings-by-channel.cfm
7 Data from Experian Hitwise, http://www.tnooz.com/article/priceline-narrows-gap-
on-expedia-top-us-travel-sites-march-3-2012/
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provided by product differentiation (Shapiro and Shi, 2008)? Why are firms 
willing to deviate from the standard practice of posting a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer? Do the firms find these strategies profitable?  
The recent literature on opaque selling addresses these and similar ques-
tions. However, to our knowledge, there are no papers that compare 
the two strategies developed by Hotwire and Priceline and account for 
the opaque features of the products offered. The question we focus on is 
whether, since there are many variants of opaque selling systems, is there 
advantage to be gained from the simultaneous use of more than one dis-
tribution channel?  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
a review of the literature. It highlights the specific characteristics of 
opaque products and the advantages of opaque systems in tourism indus-
try. It investigates the unique properties of the NYOP channel introduced 
by Priceline. Section 3 presents the analytical model. We are interested 
in the types of opaque selling systems that might be implemented by 
a given online monopoly to distribute airline tickets. We compare an 
opaque posted-price (PP) “Hotwire system” with a NYOP system with no 
possibility of rebidding, and the joint implementation of these two sys-
tems. We find that in a situation of imperfect (the travellers do not know 
the type and number of tickets that are available), but complete informa-
tion (potential clients know their number and their respective propen-
sity to pay), it is equivalent to implement the most efficient system (the 
NYOP system) or both systems in parallel. In section 4 we introduce the 
assumption of incomplete information (the travellers know their num-
ber, but not their relative propensity to pay). In this case, we find that, 
under moderate uncertainty, joint implementation of both booking sys-
tems dominates implementation of the NYOP channel only. The proofs 
are provided in the appendix. 
2. OPAQUE SELLING: A LITERATURE REVIEW
We survey the literature on opaque selling, which focuses on either PP 
opaque selling or the NYOP channel. Opaque selling includes the PP mod-
els developed by Hotwire.com, Top Secret by LastMinute.com, and the 
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NYOP mechanism developed by Priceline.com. There are no studies that 
combine these two types of opaque booking mechanisms within the same 
intermediation structure.  
With the exceptions of Wang et al. [2009], Shapiro, Zillante [2009] and 
Anderson, Wilson [2012], most work on NYOP selling mechanism ignores 
the question of product opacity. In this literature survey, we first present 
the contributions related to the opaque characteristics of the products and 
then focus on research on the NYOP booking channel. 
2.1. Opaque Products
First, we analyse the characteristics of opaque products and the advan-
tages of opaque selling. We focus on the contributions that consider 
what, in our opinion, is the most important feature of opaque selling, 
that is, that some key product’s attributes or characteristics are con-
cealed by the seller. This forces consumers to make their purchase deci-
sions blind. From the service providers’ point of view, we can iden-
tify two opposite effects. On one hand, by employing opaque selling 
the provider loses the advantages of product differentiation because, to 
consumers, opaque goods are indistinguishable and are perfect substi-
tutes (Shapiro, Shi [2008], Jerath et al. [2010]). On the other hand, since 
it is not always beneficial to fully inform consumers about the mar-
ket prices in case their price sensitivity increases and downward price 
pressures emerge, opaque selling enables service providers to generate 
incremental revenues without disrupting existing distribution chan-
nels or retail pricing structures (Smith et al. [2007], Shapiro, Shi [2008], 
Zouaoui, Rao [2009], Gal-Or [2011]). Opaqueness allows the service pro-
vider to distribute a distressed inventory at discounted prices through 
opaque intermediaries, which enable it to reach a different demand 
segment than can be achieved by traditional, transparent sales chan-
nels (Dolan, Moon [2000], Chen, Iyer [2002], Jiang [2007], Pizam [2011], 
Anderson, Wilson [2011]). Hence, it is beneficial for service providers to 
implement multichannel distribution using mechanisms that provide 
different levels of market transparency (Grandos et al. [2008], Anderson, 
Xie [2012]). In order to increase its revenues, the service provider might 
vary the price differential across different selling mechanisms and 
thus, successfully price discriminate clients (Fay [2008], Jiang [2007], 
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Grandos et al. [2008], Shapiro, Shi [2008]), because consumer valuation 
of the product may be represented as a function of the channel’s opac-
ity (Anderson, Xie [2012]). In the case of competition between service 
providers, an issue that we do not tackle in the present paper, the intro-
duction of an opaque channel increases the price competition for the 
low-value consumers’ segment, but decreases it for the high-value con-
sumers (Shapiro, Shi [2008]). This result is particularly important if 
high value consumers are sufficiently brand-loyal. On the other hand, 
if consumers’ brand loyalty is rather low, the introduction of opaque 
selling may have the opposite effect (Fay [2008]). 
Opaque selling can be regarded also as probabilistic selling, in which the 
opaque good is considered as a gamble involving a probability of getting 
any one of the sets of multiple distinct items (Fay, Xie [2008], [2010], [2012]). 
In this case, also, market segmentation is based on consumer uncertainty 
and heterogeneity in the uncertainty levels they can bear. In addition, 
since opaque intermediaries distribute the products of different service 
providers, opaque selling provides the seller with a buffer against its own 
uncertainty about the identity of the most popular product. Finally, the 
introduction of opaque selling is beneficial not only for the intermediary, 
it also affects overall welfare by enabling very price sensitive consumers 
to travel (Jiang [2007]). 
2.2. Name-Your-Own-Price selling mechanism
NYOP is a popular method of selling excess inventory over the Internet. It 
was developed in 1998 by Priceline.com, which remains the largest NYOP 
seller worldwide. It is sometimes described in the literature as an auction 
(Spann, Tellis [2006], Bernhardt, Spann [2010], Anderson, Wilson [2011], 
Gal-Or [2011]) since NYOP and auctions have several similarities. When a 
consumer visits the website of Priceline (or some other NYOP intermedi-
ary), in presenting her query, she is asked to name the price she would 
like to pay for the product, and to complete all requested data (name, 
e-mail address, credit card number). Priceline then checks the prices of 
corresponding services, loaded into its database (GDS Worldspan) by the 
service providers. If it finds a product whose price is lower than the con-
sumer’s bid, the transaction takes place. Priceline keeps the difference 
between the listed price and the price paid by the client, which represents 
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its margin (identified with another type of margin – informational – as 
the two sources of intermediary’s profits by Hann and Terwiesch [2003] 
and Gal-Or [2011]). In the literature, it is usually assumed that the inter-
mediary sets a threshold price above which it accepts the bids. If it does 
not find an appropriate product at a price corresponding to the consum-
er’s bid, this bid is rejected. In the case of a declined bid, the consumer 
cannot reformulate the same query for 24h, but she can rebid immedi-
ately by changing at least one of the product’s attributes (e.g. date, des-
tination or departure airport in the case of bidding for an airline ticket, 
hotel location or star rating in the case of accommodation search). In this 
paper, we adopt this single-bid restriction in line with Wilson, Zhang 
[2008], Wang et al. [2009], Anderson, Xie [2012], Gal-Or [2011], Shapiro 
[2011]; however, the question of relaxing this restriction i.e. allowing mul-
tiple bidding remains an important issue in existing literature since 
perfect enforcement of the single-bid policy is not always possible (Fay 
[2004], Bernhardt, Spann [2010]). Fay [2004] shows that some consumers 
use illegitimate practices to bypass this restriction (e.g. a different credit 
card number and e-mail address), which is detrimental to the interme-
diary’s profits. In practice, some NYOP sellers implement a multiple bid-
ding policy and allow consumers to engage in online haggling (Hann, 
Terwiesch [2003], Terwiesch et al. [2005], Joo et al. [2012]), and progres-
sively to raise their bids (Cai et al. [2009]) towards their reservation prices 
(Spann et al. [2004]) if their initial bids are rejected. Fay [2004] shows 
that, surprisingly, single-bid and multiple-bid policies do not modify the 
level of the intermediary’s profits. Fay and Laran [2009] apply a joint pol-
icy of multiple-bidding and varying threshold price. They show that if 
consumers suppose the threshold price to be constant, their bidding pat-
tern is monotonically increasing. However, if they expect it to vary, their 
bidding behaviour depends on their patience and the expected degree 
of threshold price variability. The fact of changing the threshold may 
attract and retain more customers, and does not necessarily reduce cus-
tomer satisfaction (Fay, Laran [2009], Hinz et al. [2011]), which contrasts 
with what might be expected. 
Another important feature of NYOP system, which is related to its prof-
itability, is the secrecy surrounding the threshold price (Bajari, Hortaçsu 
[2003], [2004], Hinz, Spann [2010]). For bidders, it is important to learn the 
maximum on its level in order to bid near to it but not to overbid. In this 
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paper we suppose that potential bidders estimate the thresholds levels,8 
perfectly in the case of complete information (i.e. the benchmark case) and 
imperfectly under uncertainty. In reality, in the context of the Internet, 
consumers share information on their successful and unsuccessful bids 
with their online communities and on forums (ex. BiddingForTravel.
com, BetterBidding.com). Bidders use the available information in order 
to update their references prices, product valuations and beliefs about 
thresholds, in order to derive maximum savings (Joo et al. [2012]), all of 
which decreases the sellers’ profits. NYOP intermediaries may react dif-
ferent to this information diffusion (Hinz, Spann [2010]). They may adapt 
their threshold prices levels (Fay, Laran [2009], Hinz et al. [2011]) or they 
may manipulate the quality and availability of the information diffused 
(Wolk, Spann [2008], Hinz, Spann [2010], Cai, Cude [2011], Spann et al. [2012]), 
by contributing to these forums or posting reference prices on their own 
websites. One possibility is to implement a Select-Your-Price mechanism 
(Spann et al. [2012]). In this case consumers are influenced by the range of 
possible candidate bids. Providing a list of possible bids could be perceived 
as a format that provides more information about the seller’s threshold 
price and, thus, decreases the customer’s uncertainty about the product’s 
value. The effective bid amounts and intermediary’s profits, depend on 
the level of possible bids provided. If they are too low or too high i.e. seem 
unrealistic or unacceptable, their effect will be negative. 
In relation to the distribution of threshold prices, the most common cus-
tomer belief, which we adopt in the paper, is that the threshold is uni-
formly distributed across an interval (Hann, Terwiesch [2003], Fay [2004], 
Terwiesch et al. [2005], Fay, Laran [2009], Wang et al. [2009]). In this paper, 
we adopt the assumption of uniformity of threshold distribution as a con-
sequence of customers’ uniform reservation price distribution. In our 
model consumers’ valuations of tickets are uniformly distributed (on two 
identical segments). The literature includes similar settings (Fay [2004], 
Almadoss, Jain [2008], Wang et al. [2009], Anderson, Xie [2012], Shapiro 
[2011], Fay, Xie [2012]).  
8 Following the assumption developed by Fay [2004], we consider that there are two 
possible thresholds: one when the supply is very limited, and the other when there 
are more tickets available. However, unlike Fay [2004], we assume the intermediary 
keeps both levels secret.
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This paper compares the use of an opaque NYOP channel, an opaque 
PP channel, and their joint implementation. In the model, once the cus-
tomer’s bid is rejected, she cannot purchase the product via the opaque 
PP channel. This is the same assumption as in Wang et al. [2009]. The 
nonsequentiality of the booking mechanism is an important point, and 
it distinguishes our setting from the frameworks in the literature. In 
particular, Anderson and Xie [2012] consider a firm which tends to set 
optimal full information prices, opaque prices and an optimal thresh-
old policy at the NYOP retailer. Although these prices are set simulta-
neously, sequential use of distribution channels is possible in this set-
ting. Customers choose one of channels or, in the case of rejected bids, 
the sequence of channels. They make their decisions based on their val-
uation, PP levels, and on the probability of their bid being accepted. For 
the firm it is always optimal to post both full information and opaque 
prices, especially if the opaque price, as a function of the channel’s 
opacity, converges to a full information price. However, in this frame-
work, it is not always optimal to implement the NYOP channel. Shapiro 
[2011] compares a non-opaque NYOP and PP channels with risk adverse 
buyers. He shows that in the case of risk neutral buyers the NYOP prof-
its coincide with the PP profits. If buyers are risk-averse, the NYOP 
profits outweigh the PP benefits. Then, like Anderson and Xie [2012], 
Shapiro considers a NYOP intermediary which adds to its offer a PP 
option. This option captures the demand of rejected bidders. Finally, 
Shapiro considers the same situation with the presence of a competi-
tive alternative PP option. In this case, the seller needs to be cautious 
about modifying the PP in order not to lose its clients. This framework 
explains why Priceline has developed a PP non-opaque system on its 
website. The main differences with our paper and our contributions to 
knowledge, are that: first, we consider that the use of both models is 
simultaneous and following a rejected bid the customer has no possibil-
ity of acquiring the ticket; second, that the products are opaque; and 
third, that capacity is limited. In the opposite cases, the intermediary 
and potential clients would adopt different behaviour, therefore, the 
issue would not be the same (Cai et al. [2009], Fay, Xie [2012]). 
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3. DIVERSIFICATION OF OPAQUE CHANNELS 
WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION
Despite the extensive literature, there is one question that has not been 
addressed, that is, since many variants of opaque systems exist, is there 
an advantage in using simultaneously more than one distribution chan-
nel? This is the question addressed in this paper.  
The answer is complex and depends on many circumstances, mainly the 
competitive environment. If we consider a competitive game, in which 
every competitor chooses one channel, the equilibrium could be asymmet-
ric, where each intermediary specialises and distributes on a specific chan-
nel. If Agencies A, B and C compete on alternative channels: opaque PP, 
transparent Last Minute and opaque NYOP channel, each should special-
ise in different types of selling and should serve specific demand segments. 
If there is only one agency in a monopoly position and the objective is to 
find the best allocation of potential travellers on alternative channels, the 
best solution, theoretically, would be first-degree price discrimination. As 
in many other cases, this strategy is not implementable due to its complex-
ity, and because the consumers’ willingness to pay is private information 
and there is no incentive for its revelation. The NYOP opaque solution (the 
Priceline system) seems to be the most similar. Suppose that the population 
of travellers is risk-neutral, fully informed about the characteristics of unsold 
tickets (airline, departure time, etc.) and knows perfectly the distribution of 
other potential travellers’ propensities to pay, each consumer is able to bid 
(or not) a price corresponding to her reservation price, given the uncertainty 
about the number of seats available and their attributes. However, this result 
depends on the level of incompleteness of the potential traveller’s informa-
tion. Suppose for instance that potential travellers with a high propensity to 
pay are less well informed about the ticket distribution and the propensity 
to pay of other agents. In this case, they will likely over-estimate the util-
ity they can derive from the NYOP channel and bid a lower price than they 
would under complete information. In this case, implementation of a last 
minute channel would be a better strategy. However, this solution has one 
main inconvenience: it has a negative effect on the existing pricing struc-
ture, by creating a downward pressure. In this paper we consider the last 
minute selling channel as complementary to the opaque channel.  
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It is complicated to decide whether two or more forms of opaque chan-
nels can coexist. Consider, for instance, the opaque NYOP Priceline and 
the opaque PP Hotwire channels. Both channels are opaque, i.e. do not 
give precise information to the would-be travellers about the quality of 
the travel. Again, if all passengers had complete information on flight 
frequency and other ticket attributes, and if they knew precisely the dis-
tribution of the other consumers’ propensities to pay, all would choose to 
use only the NYOP system, and would quit the PP channel, which would 
be rendered redundant. In the following subsection we try to confirm 
this intuition. 
3.1. The model
There are 2n  potential travellers distributed in two sub-populations of n  
agents, both willing to travel from city 1 to city 2. The travellers belonging 
to the sub-population A prefer the 7:00 flight and the sub-population B – 
the 18:00 flight. Each subset of n  potential travellers is distributed uni-
formly on a segment 0,[ ]a  with a > 0 . The gross utility of traveller i , 
located at the point a
i
> 0  on the segment 0,[ ]a  is a u ui +( ), { }u u, > 0  
when she travels at her preferred time and only a u
i
 when she takes the 
other flight. All travellers are risk neutral, i.e. they care only about maxi-
mizing their utility. If a traveller decides not to purchase the product and 
not to bid, or her bid is not accepted, her utility vanishes. In the case of 
a rejected bid, the unsuccessful bidder has no possibility of rebidding or 
buying the ticket on the PP channel. 
There is one OTA, which is in a monopoly position9 and implements an 
adapted opaque selling system in order to distribute flight tickets from 
city 1 to city 2 for given airlines. It maximizes its and the airlines’ prof-
its. To keep the results simple, we consider that the OTA does not bear any 
costs; for any costs level, the analysis yields the same insights. We suppose 
that the OTA receives a fixed percentage of each ticket sold since it oper-
ates under a merchant model10.  
9 Priceline.com benefits from a monopoly position in the U.S. market due to its book-
ing system Name-Your-Own-Price being patented.
10 It receives a commission after each booking, but makes no commitment on inven-
tory, therefore it takes no risk.
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Each day there are two flights from city 1 to city 2: the first leaves at 7:00 
and the second at 18:00. The number and the nature of available seats are 
estimated with a small error just a few days before the flight departure 
date. There are five possible states of the world, defined in Table 1. The 
OTA knows their distribution and the potential travellers’ number and 
locations on the two segments. There are always more potential travellers 
than available seats in all states of the world, i.e. n m . Tickets are sold 
on a first-come-first-served basis.  
Table 1. Available seats for the flights from city 1 to city 2  
on a given date
States of the world Number and type of available seats Probability 
1 m  at 7:00 1/4  
2 m  at 18:00 1/4  
3 2m  at 7:00 1/8  
4 m  at 7:00 
m  at 18:00 
1/4  
5 2m  at 18:00 1/8  
The OTA implements either: 
(i) an opaque PP system; 
(ii) an opaque NYOP system; 
(iii) both systems jointly. 
The sequence of actions is as follows: 
 − At stage 1, the OTA chooses among (i), (ii) and (iii). If it selects (i) 
or (iii), then at the same moment it sets the price of the PP chan-
nel. If the OTA chooses (ii) or (iii), it launches a single bidding pro-
cess for the tickets.  
 − At stage 2, if the OTA initially chose (i), potential travellers will decide 
to buy or not a ticket on the PP channel. If the OTA selected (ii), they 
will choose to post or not a single bid. If the OTA chose (iii), poten-
tial travellers will decide to buy a ticket on the PP channel, or to bid 
on the NYOP channel, or to reserve. 
 − At stage 3, the OTA knows the exact number and nature of the avail-
able seats on each flight. If (i) or (iii) was chosen at stage 1, the OTA 
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delivers the tickets to its clients on the PP channel. If (ii) or (iii) was 
selected, the agency fixes the threshold price for the NYOP chan-
nel and sells the tickets to those bidders whose bids exceeded this 
threshold. Each successful bidder pays the rate she posted. 
The relevant equilibrium concept is a Stackelberg equilibrium, where the 
OTA is the leader. The game is solved by backward induction. At stage 3, the 
OTA chooses the best action (i.e. it fixes the threshold price of the NYOP 
channel if (ii) or (iii) was selected), given potential travellers’ actions at 
stage 2. At stage 2 potential travellers choose their own best options, given 
the OTA’s decisions at time 1 (the distribution system chosen and the PP 
channel rate, if strategies (i) or (iii) were implemented), OTA’s expected 
decisions at stage 3, and the probability of their bids being accepted. At 
stage 1, the OTA chooses the appropriate distribution strategy and the rate 
applied on the posted-price channel if strategy (i) or (iii) is implemented. 
We suppose that information is imperfect, but complete, i.e. travellers 
know the states of the world and their respective probability, but they do 
not know which is realized. 
3.2. The optimal choices of the OTA
Let us consider the three OTA solutions in order. 
(i) If the opaque PP channel is implemented on its own, the OTA at stage 1 
sets the price pPP , which maximizes the airlines’ and OTA’s joint profit 
p ( )p mpPP PP= . The number of seats available for the channel is fixed 
at stage 1 as m , which is the highest number of seats always available at 
stage 3 in all states of the world.11 Then, the level of pPP  is such that the 
OTA extracts the whole surplus of the last traveller choosing the PP chan-
nel. Whatever the rate for this channel fixed at stage 1, the potential trav-
ellers, whose net utility is greater than or equal to zero at this rate, will 
choose to buy a ticket via this channel at stage 2. Then, the best solution 
for the OTA is to charge a rate that clears the last potential PP channel 
11 Theoretically, the OTA could sell more than m  tickets, because in some states of the 
world there are 2m  tickets available. However, as in case of overbooking it would be 
sued and it prefers to implement the safety strategy of selling only m  tickets.
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client’s surplus. These travellers are located on each segment at points a
i
1 , 
such as ( )a a a m n
i
− / = /1 2 , i.e. at a a n m n
i
1 2 2= − /( ) . The resulting value 
of pPP , which wipes out the net utility of agents located at a
i
1 , then is 
a u u p
i
PP1 2 0( )+ / − = , since the states of the world and the distribution 
of agents on the segments 0,[ ]a  are common knowledge. Then, we obtain 
p a n m u u n
PP = − + / /( )( )2 2 2  and 
 p PP PPmp nm m a u u n= = − + / / .( ) ( )2 2 22  (1)
(ii) If the opaque NYOP channel is the only channel implemented at stage 3 
and in each state of the world, the OTA chooses the higher threshold value, 
such that travellers, whose bids are greater than or equal to this thresh-
old, clear the market. Since the OTA determines this value after observ-
ing the state of the world, there are two possibilities. If only m  tickets are 
available, the price p
H
N  is high: it corresponds to the reservation price of 
the ( )n m th−  traveller if potential buyers are ranked according to their 
increasing propensity to pay. If the number of available tickets is 2m , 
the price p
H
N  is lower because it corresponds to the propensity to pay of 
the ( )n m th− 2  traveller, who integrates uncertainty in her expected util-
ity function. At stage 2, the bidders are able to take account, in their 
decisions, of the optimal choices of the OTA and, among other things, to 
consider the possibility of their bids being accepted. If they are able to 
understand the NYOP system correctly, they will be able to calculate the 
last successful bid in each state of the world and may post it if it is lower 
than or at least equal to their reservation price. In the case of imper-
fect, but complete information, there exist two possible bids: p
H
N , which 
guarantees the travel in all states of the world, and p
L
N , which makes 
the travel uncertain. Potential travellers bid only p
L
N  or p
H
N : their net 
expected utility is then defined by a u u p
i H
N( )+ / −2  if they decide to bid 
p
H
N , and a u u p
i L
N( )+ /[ − /2 2 , if they decide to bid pL
N . Elementary cal-
culus allow us to deduce the threshold values a
i
2∗  and a
i
2∗∗  separating on 
each segment [ ]0,a  potential travellers choosing not to bid and potential 
travellers bidding p
L
N , potential travellers choosing to bid p
L
N  and poten-
tial travellers who bid p
H
N  respectively. These values are a a n m n
i
2∗ = − /( )  
and a a n m n
i
2 2 2∗∗ = − /( ) . Then we can deduce the equilibrium threshold 
prices p a n m u u n
L
N = − + / /( )( )2  and p a n m u u n
H
N = − + / /( )( )2 2 2 , and 
the joint airlines’ and OTA’s profit pi mP mPN H
N
L






mp mp nm m a u u n= + / = − + / / .( ) ( ) ( )2 2 3 2 2 22  (2)
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(iii) If both channels are implemented jointly, the OTA allocates the first 
set of m  seats to the PP channel, targeting customers with a higher pro-
pensity to pay. The second set of m  seats is assigned to the NYOP chan-
nel, serving the travellers with lower propensity to pay. At stage 1, the OTA 
chooses the price of the PP channel and offers the travellers the possibil-
ity to bid on the NYOP channel. As in case (i), the price of the PP channel 
is p a n m u u nPP = − + / /( )( )2 2 2 . The NYOP channel attracts the next m  
travellers and the threshold price is p a n m u u n
L
N = − + / /( )( )2 . The joint 




/ = + / 2  or: 
 p PP N PP
L
N
mp mp nm m a u u n
/ = + / = − + / / .2 3 2 2 22( ) ( )  (3)
Consequently, we can hypothesize that: 
Proposition 1. If potential low rate travellers are completely informed 
about the random number and distribution of available seats, and the 
other agents’ propensities to pay, it is equivalent for the airlines and the 
OTA to implement a NYOP channel alone or to implement the PP and NYOP 
channels jointly. 
Proof: Expressions (1), (2) and (3) represent the airlines’ and OTA’s joint prof-
its at Stackelberg equilibriums associated respectively with the implemen-
tation of the PP or NYOP channels and both channels jointly. Comparison 
among (1), (2) and (3) proves that, whatever the values of the parameters 
u u a n, , , , and m , p p pO N N PP/ = > , it is equivalent for the OTA to imple-
ment the NYOP or both systems jointly. 
According to the previous intuition, the opaque PP channel is not an opti-
mal solution for potential travellers if it is implemented on its own. The 
travellers with a higher propensity to pay are indifferent between this 
selling mechanism and its joint implementation with the opaque NYOP 
channel, while the travellers with a low propensity to pay prefer the other 
two distribution strategies. We observe also that it is equivalent for high 
propensity travellers to pay pPP  on the PP channel or to use the NYOP 
channel. 
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4. JOINT OPAQUE CHANNELS 
WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
There is a first type of information incompleteness that is associated with 
travellers’ uncertainty concerning the stochastic distribution of demand 
on traditional channels. The seasonal, daily and hourly evolution of tra-
ditional demand follows complex laws which are not easily understand-
able by travellers. The statistical distribution of demand variations dur-
ing the period could involve information incompleteness or information 
asymmetries, on the one hand between the OTA and the travellers, and 
on the other hand among the travellers. However, it is advantageous for 
airlines to partly adapt their supply to these variations. Consequently, it 
is advantageous for airlines and the OTA to spread the appropriate statis-
tics on the available seat distribution for each destination, during every 
time sub-period. Then, we can assume that this lack of information is not 
the main reason for travellers’ uncertainty, and can focus on the second 
type of information incompleteness. Bidders generally lack relevant infor-
mation on other consumers’ propensities to pay. The important number of 
potential travellers makes it difficult for each bidder to perceive the pro-
pensities to pay distribution. This lack of information has dramatic con-
sequences: under information completeness, our example provides only 
two bid prices when the NYOP or the PP system and the NYOP jointly are 
implemented. In this case, whatever the traveller’s propensity to pay, it 
will never be interesting for her to bid a price different from p
L
N  or p
H
N . 
In contrast, under incomplete information, travellers cannot perfectly 
estimate p
L
N  or p
H
N . Then, it might be rational for them to bid different 
prices if the selling system is the NYOP mechanism. 
4.1. The general setting
Let us consider the segment that accommodates all potential travellers 
preferring the 7:00 (resp. the 18:00) flight, and assume that travellers do 
not know their precise position on this segment. This uncertainty implies 
that their estimations of the other travellers distribution on the segment, 
and especially the distance a a
i
,[ ]  between their own location and the 
location of the agent with the highest propensity to pay, are imprecise. 
Then, we suppose that the agent located on a
i
 estimates a  as a : 
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 a a q a a q a q
i i i
− = − + − , ∈ ,[ ].( ) ( )1 0 1  (4)
When q = 0 , there is full uncertainty on a ’s position and the traveller 
locates herself in the middle of the segment [ ]0,a . When q =1, the infor-
mation on her position is perfect, so she can perfectly estimate the thresh-
old levels, as described in the previous section. When q  is strictly com-
prised of between 0 and 1, the uncertainty about the agent’s location is 
more or less moderate. We suppose that the OTA is aware of the agents’ 
confusion about their relative propensities to pay. Thus, we can consider 
the three possible strategic choices among the implementations of alterna-
tive selling mechanisms. 
(i) If only the PP channel is implemented with price pPP , all the trav-
ellers have information on prices when taking their decision at 
time 2. Their behaviour is unchanged compared to the behaviour 
in Section 3. They buy tickets if a u u p
i
PP1 2 0( )+ / − ≥  and do not if 
a u u p
i
PP1 2 0( )+ / − < . The result is the same as in case of complete infor-
mation, i.e., p a n m u u nPP = − + / /( )( )2 2 2  and 
 p PP PPmp nm m a u u n= = − + / / .( ) ( )2 2 22  (5)
(ii) If only the NYOP channel is implemented, at time 2 the bidders esti-
mate the probability of their bid being successful. Given (4), they still com-
pare a u u p
i H
N( )+ / −2  (their estimated net utility if they choose to bid p
H
N  
and expect to travel, in all states of the world) and a u u p
i L
N( )+ /[ − /2 2  
(their estimated net utility if they choose to bid higher than p
L
N , but 
lower than p
H
N , and accept the possibility of not travelling if there 
are only m  tickets available) and 0 (their estimated net utility if they 
decide not to bid). In this case, they are bound in their individual esti-
mations of a
i
2∗  and a
i
2∗∗  to evaluate p
L
N  and p
H
N . Given (4), they calculate 








2 2 2 2 2∗∗ = − + − /( )( ) , 




= − + − + / /( )( )( )2 2 2  and p a
Hi
N = − 
p aq a q a u u n m n
i i
= − + + / − /( )( )( )2 2 2 2 2  – the threshold prices (depending 
on their location a
i
, when the total number of seats is respectively m  and 
2m ). The higher the propensity to pay of the traveller located in a
i
, the 
greater high and low threshold prices for the NYOP channel she will expect. 
Potential travellers located at a
i
 on one of the segments 0,[ ]a  consider 
themselves marginal agents between travellers choosing the reservation 
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= = − + − /∗2 2 2( )( ) , 
i.e. a aq n m nq mq n m
i
p2 2 2 2∗ = − / − − +( ) [ ] . Similarly, agents located on the 




= = − + − /∗∗2 2 2 2 2( )( ) , i.e. a aq n
i
p2 ∗∗ = − 
q n m nq mq n m2 4 2 2 2= − / − − +( ) ( )  consider themselves as limit agents 
between the low rate and high rate bidders. Note that these thresholds 
depend on q , i.e. on the level of travellers’ uncertainty about their rela-
tive positions on 0,[ ]a . Then, at stage 2, potential travellers bids depend, 
first, on their position on 0,[ ]a  and, second, on the level of uncertainty. 




2 2∗∗ ∗∗≥ . Then, at stage 3, there are three possible 
cases based on parameter values and uncertainty levels: 




p2 2 2 2∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗< < < , 




p2 2 2 2∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗∗< < < , 




p2 2 2 2∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗< < < . 
(iii) If the NYOP system is implemented jointly with the PP channel, the 
OTA still allocates the first set of m  seats to the PP, targeting custom-
ers with a higher propensity to pay. The price of the PP channel pPP  is 
unchanged. The second set of m  seats is still assigned to the NYOP chan-
nel and distributed to potential travellers with a lower propensity to pay. 
At time 2 the bidders estimate the probability of their bids being success-
ful. Given (4), they still compare a u u p
i L
N( )+ /[ − /2 2  (their estimated 
net utility if they choose to bid higher than p
L
N ) and 0 (their estimated 
net utility if they decide not to bid). In this case, they use their individ-
ual estimations of a
i
2∗  to evaluate p
L
N . Similar to the NYOP only strat-




2 2 2∗ = − + − /( )( ) , and then deduce 




= − + − + / /( )( )( )2 2 2 . Again, the 
potential travellers located at a
i
 on one of the segments 0,[ ]a  consider 
themselves marginal agents between travellers choosing reservation and 




= = − + − /∗2 2 2( )( ) , i.e. 
a aq n m nq mq n m
i
p2 2 2 2∗ = − / − − +( ) [ ] . Note that the threshold depends 
on q , i.e. the level of travellers’ uncertainty about their relative positions 
on 0,[ ]a . Then at stage 2, potential travellers’ bids depend, first, on their 
position on 0,[ ]a  and, second, on the level of uncertainty. Finally, under 
the joint implementation strategy, at stage 3 the three cases defined in (ii) 
still hold. 
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The first case is the most representative of the reality and, thus, is the 
case we analyse below. We dismiss the second case because according to 
the huge amount of easily available information, including information 
on external reference prices,12 it is unrealistic to consider high levels of 
consumer uncertainty. We dismiss the third case because it implies a large 
number of tickets m n> / 2  (compared with the number of potential trav-
ellers), which means that, in the absence of an additional clearance chan-
nel (opaque PP or opaque NYOP or even classic last-minute), airlines would 
experience a huge excess capacity. Although during the crisis period, the 
trend among most airlines has been to reduce capacity to an optimum 
level in order to minimize excess capacity, consequently we consider this 
third case to be unrealistic. 
4.2. Average number of tickets, moderate uncertainty
In the first case we suppose that the number of available tickets is less 
than half the number of potential travellers, m n< / 2 . In this case all 







∗ ∗> > / .13 By moderate uncertainty we mean that q∈ / ,[ ]1 2 1 , 
which implies that a
i
p2 ∗  is lower than a
i
2∗∗ .  
Figure 1. Case 1, 2m  tickets available 
In this case, when the NYOP system is implemented, as illustrated in 
Figure (1), the threshold between the bids of those who expect to travel 
12 For an extensive analysis of this issue see Chernev [2003], Kamins et al. [2004], and 
Wolk, Spann [2008].
13 Remained that a potential traveller is someone interested in travelling at a positive 
utility rate: it is realistic to suppose that there are always potential travellers, espe-
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in all states of the world and those who expect to travel only if a large 
number of tickets is available, is higher than in the case of complete 
information. Consequently, travellers under-estimate the number of 
travellers able to travel in all states of the world. Therefore, bidders 
located between a
i
p2 ∗∗  and a  pay higher (and different) rates than in 
the case of complete information (and they are sure of travelling in all 
states of the world), while the travellers located between a
i
2∗∗  and a
i
p2 ∗∗  
pay lower (and also different) rates (and suffer the same level of uncer-
tainty of their bid being accepted as in the case of complete informa-
tion). At the same time, the travellers located between a
i
p2 ∗  and a
i
2∗∗  pay 
relatively high14 (and different) rates and travel only if 2m  tickets are 
available. Finally, potential travellers located between a
i
2∗  and a
i
p2 ∗  do 
not bid because, under the prevailing uncertainty, they believe that the 
lower threshold price P
Li
N  corresponds to the relative propensity to pay 
of the agent located at a
i
p2 ∗  and, consequently, that their bid would not 
be sufficiently high. When the number of available tickets is 2m , the 
result again is an extra-profit for the OTA and the airlines, derived from 
selling tickets to the subset of travellers located between a
i
p2 ∗  and a
i
2∗∗ , 
and the remaining unsold tickets corresponding to potential travellers 
located between a
i
2∗  and a
i
p2 ∗ .  
When the PP channel is implemented on its own, only the travellers 
located between a
i
2∗∗  and a  choose to travel at the uniform posted rate 
corresponding to a
i
2∗∗  on the segment. 
When the PP and NYOP systems are implemented jointly, the travellers 
located between a
i
2∗∗  and a  still choose the PP system, while the trav-
ellers located between a
i
p2 ∗  and a
i
2∗∗  still choose to bid relatively high15 
(and different) prices and travel only if 2m  tickets are available. Then, 
the PP channel remains dominated by the joint implementation of the 
two systems. The relevant comparison is between only implementation of 
the NYOP channel, and its joint implementation with the PP system and, 
especially, from the OTA’s point of view, the profits generated by the trav-
ellers located between a
i
2∗∗  and a  in case of NYOP and joint implemen-
tation. 
14 As compared to a
i
2∗ , the threshold level in situation of complete information.
15 Compared to a
i
2∗ .
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If the NYOP channel is implemented alone, the OTA profits are expressed 
by (6) 
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( ) , given the level of 
uncertainty corresponding to case (1), represent the number of tickets 
obtained by travellers bidding high and getting a ticket in all states of the 
world, and the number of tickets obtained by travellers, who bid low for a 
ticket if 2m  tickets are available. 
If the OTA decides to implement both systems jointly, its profits are given 

















/ + / − /
∗
= − + / /
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D− − / / + / − / −  .
∗∗ ∗1 2 2 2 12 2)( ) (( ) )
 (7)
Let us begin with an illustration of joint implementation of the PP and 
NYOP systems strongly dominating implementation of only the NYOP or 
only the PP channels. We choose the case where n = 9  and m = 4 . In this 
case, each subset of n  agents is located on the segment [ ]0,a . 
In the case of complete information, travellers 8 and 9 are able to fly in all 
states of the world and travellers 6 and 7 are able to travel only when there 
are 8 tickets available (recall that there are 2n  travellers located on two 
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∗∗ = / , which correspond respectively to the reservation prices 
of the 6th  and 8th  travellers. 
Then, we consider the case of incomplete information. We choose 
q = /35 36 , which corresponds to a very moderate level of uncertainty 
(with q =1, the potential travellers have complete information on other 
bidders’ reservation prices). Since in this case a
i
p2 ∗∗  is located between 
a
i
2∗∗  and a , when only the NYOP system is implemented, only the trav-
eller 9 chooses to bid high (which makes her flight certain), while travel-
lers 7 and 8 choose to bid low (with the probability p = /1 2  to travel), and 
agent 6 does not bid. When there are m = 4  tickets available, only agents 8 
and 9 travel and (in this case) at very different rates. Given the parameter 




2∗∗ ∗∗= , which can be deduced from the general for-





2 2 2 1 2
∗∗ = − + − − /( )( ( )) , which, when m  and n  are 





2 2 2 2
∗∗ = − + − /( )( ) . 
The first traveller’s bid corresponds to a p
9
2 0 859∗∗ = . , while the second trav-




∗ = . . The sum of their bids 1 472. , is the OTA’s profit 
obtained by distribution to the high rate population when only the NYOP 
system is implemented. When both systems are implemented jointly, 
agents 8 and 9 choose the PP system and each pays the PP, which cor-
responds to the reservation price of agent 8: a
8
2 0 833∗∗ = . . The resulting 
profit for the OTA is 1 666. , compared to the profit obtained when the 
NYOP system is implemented on its own, of 1 472. . Since agent 7 still bids 
the same amount a p
6
2 ∗  with or without the PP system and agent 6 still does 
not bid, joint implementation of these two systems provides higher prof-
its to the OTA.  
We generalize this observation in the following proposition: 




p2 2 2 2∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗< < < , 
joint implementation of the PP and NYOP is always the best solution for 
the OTA. 
Proof: see Appendix 1.  
When we compare joint implementation of these systems with implemen-
tation only of the NYOP channel, consumers located between a
i
2∗  and 
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a
i
2∗∗  choose the same options. Therefore, we focus on travellers located 
between a
i
2∗∗  and a . In the case of joint implementation, all these con-
sumers travel and pay the same opaque PP of PPP . If only the NYOP sys-
tem is implemented, the same agents pay very different prices. Consumers 
located between a
i
p2 ∗∗  and a  are sure of being able to travel in all states of 
the world by bidding high prices, evaluated individually, P
Hi
N . These bids 
are higher than the opaque PP would have been. Alternatively, consum-
ers located between a
i
2∗∗  and a
i
p2 ∗∗  are convinced that the threshold price, 
which guarantees travel in all states of the world, is higher than their 
reservation price and, thus, bid much lower prices, evaluated individu-
ally, P
Li
N , which enable them to travel only if there are 2m  tickets availa-
ble. Their estimation of their position on the segment is much lower than 
the reality. Whatever the number of available tickets, they will be able to 
travel. The bids P
Li
N  are lower than the opaque PP PPP  would have been. 
These bids converge to the reservation price of the agent who considers she 
would be the last to travel, if there were 2m  tickets available, i.e. a
i
p2 ∗ . 
The profit surplus resulting from high bids does not compensate the profit 
loss from low consumer bids. 
The spread between the two profits as a function of the number of tick-
ets available m∈ ,[ ]20 32 , increases with the uncertainty, as illustrated in 
Figure 2a,b,c. Figure 2a illustrates the case of relative uncertainty, q = .0 7 ; 
Figure 2b illustrates moderate uncertainty, q = .0 8 , and finally Figure 2c 
illustrates the case of no uncertainty, q =1, when both profits are equal. 
All other parameters remain unchanged and are normalized to: a = 20 , 
u =15 , u =10  and n = 75 . 
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5. CONCLUSION
Drawing on the literature reviewed, which illustrates the extent of the 
questions raised by opaque selling in tourism, this paper considered the 
possibility of joint implementation of two different opaque systems by the 
same OTA. The first is the PP channel; the second takes the form of an auc-
tion where only travellers bidding over the unknown (hidden) threshold 
prices are sure to travel in all states of the world.  
We built a three-stage game model describing the optimal choices of a 
travel agent facing the population of potential travellers with differen-
tiated reservation prices. We studied this game in the context of poten-
tial travellers’ imperfect, but complete information. In this case, potential 
travellers do not know the exact number and characteristics of available 
seats, but they do know the states of the world and their corresponding 
probabilities. They also know the number of potential travellers and their 
respective reservation prices. These assumptions are usual in the first 
strand of developments of an opaque pricing strategy analysis. With these 
types of assumptions, and assuming risk neutrality to analyse the travel-
lers bids in the NYOP case, we find that joint implementation of the NYOP 
and PP systems provides no advantages over single implementation of the 
NYOP channel. Obviously, since, all things being equal, risk adverse trav-
ellers tend to prefer the PP system to the more risky NYOP auction, risk 
aversion might be a reason for implementing the PP system as an alter-
native to NYOP. Since travellers’ risk aversion of travellers is not easily 
observable and probably less important for the low valuation traveller sub-
population, the choice of only the NYOP system is the best solution since, 
joint implementation of the two systems would increase operational costs 
and probably complicate the traveller’s choice for no good reason.  
We next extended the model to the case of incomplete information. In 
this case, the individual traveller does not know the characteristics of 
any other traveller. We limit this unawareness to reservation price levels 
and suppose that the number of potential travellers is known. This case 
has never been considered explicitly in the literature despite its relevance 
for real-life contexts, where the number and other statistical characteris-
tics of given potential travellers are difficult for other bidders to identify. 
Several cases can be considered, related to the proportions of potential 
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travellers and available tickets in each state of the world. We focus on the 
case we consider the most relevant: average number of available tickets 
relative to the number of potential travellers, and moderate uncertainty 
related to the distribution of other agent characteristics. We find that in 
this setting joint implementation of the PP and NYOP systems always dom-
inates single implementation of the NYOP channel, even with the risk 
neutrality hypothesis we assume in this study.  
A first basic extension would be to consider the other two cases. For 
instance, the context of strong uncertainty and the PP system on its own 
dominating, could have interesting properties. More interesting, would be 
to consider competition among OTAs in a market with a small number of 
intermediaries. Would a ‘separating’ solution be the best in this case, with 
the opaque PP system chosen by one OTA and the opaque NYOP by another, 
or would these competing agents reap advantage from each implementing 
both systems? 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
Given that potential travellers located between a
i
2∗  and a
i
2∗∗  choose the 
same action whether the NYOP is implemented alone or jointly with the 
PP system, we consider only the optimal actions of potential travellers 
located between a
i
2∗∗  and a . According to the relative values of n , m  





N , according to her own position related to a
i
p2 ∗∗ . If the agent is 
located between a
i
2∗∗  and a
i
p2 ∗∗ , she chooses to bid a low price P
Lj
N . If she 
is located between a
i
p2 ∗∗  and a , she bids the high price P
Hj
N . If the two 
systems are implemented jointly, all potential travellers located between 
a
i
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 (9)
Comparison of the profit equations (8) and (9) shows that it is always more 
profitable for the OTA to implement both systems jointly than to imple-
ment only the NYOP channel. Indeed, there are no possible parameter val-
ues that make the profit p N  greater than the profit p PP N/ . In this com-
parison, we focus on profits driven by consumers located between a
i
2∗∗  
and a . Indeed, it is more profitable for the OTA to provide these travel-
lers with the opaque PP product rather than letting them bid at different 
price levels.16  
16 Computation details are available upon request.
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Figure 3. Comparison between NYOP and joint implementation in case 1 
according to uncertainty level
Figure 3 (3) illustrates that a decrease in the uncertainty level (correspond-
ing to an increase in q  from 0.5 to 1) reduces the spread between p O N/  
and p N . These two profits become equal in the case of no uncertainty i.e. 
q =1. All other parameter levels are normalized to: m n≤ / 2  with m = 32  
and n = 75 , a = 20 , u =15  and u = 5 . 
According to Figures (2) and (3) the conditions on parameters a , u , u , 
1 2 1/ < <q  and the condition m n≤ / 2  are sufficient to make p N  smaller 
than p O N/  in all cases.
